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Abstract
In a dot-probe task, two cues—one emotional and one neutral—are followed by a probe in one of their locations. Faster 
responses to probes co-located with the emotional stimulus are taken as evidence of attentional bias. Several studies indicate 
that such attentional bias measures have poor reliability, even though ERP studies show that people reliably attend to the 
emotional stimulus. This inconsistency might arise because the emotional stimulus captures attention briefly (as indicated 
by ERP), but cues appear for long enough that attention can be redistributed before the probe onset, causing RT measures 
of bias to vary across trials. We tested this hypothesis by manipulating SOA (stimulus onset asynchrony between onset of 
the cues and onset of the probe) in a dot-probe task using angry and neutral faces. Across three experiments, the internal 
reliability of behavioural biases was significantly greater than zero when probes followed faces by 100 ms, but not when the 
SOA was 300, 500, or 900 ms. Thus, the initial capture of attention shows some level of consistency, but this diminishes 
quickly. Even at the shortest SOA internal reliability estimates were poor, and not sufficient to justify the use of the task as 
an index of individual differences in attentional bias.
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Introduction
A number of theories of emotion posit that attention is biased 
towards threatening stimuli (Öhman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 
2001; Okon-Singer, Lichtenstein-Vidne, & Cohen, 2013; 
Pourtois, Schettino, & Vuilleumier, 2013; Yiend, 2010). A 
common paradigm used for measuring such attentional bias 
is the dot-probe task (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; 
Mogg & Bradley, 1999), in which a pair of stimuli are pre-
sented on opposite sides of a display: one neutral and one 
emotional (commonly threatening). Subsequently, a probe 
is presented in the location previously occupied by one of 
the stimuli, and participants must respond to a feature of 
the probe. Attentional biases are inferred in the dot-probe 
task when participants respond faster to probes that replace 
emotional than neutral stimuli.
While anxious participants regularly show an attentional 
bias to threat, this bias is not always shown by non-anxious 
participants (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). However, indices of 
attentional allocation from EEG studies reveal that even 
non-anxious participants preferentially attend to threatening 
images (Eimer & Kiss, 2007; Grimshaw, Foster, & Corbal-
lis, 2014; Holmes, Bradley, Kragh Nielsen, & Mogg, 2009; 
Kappenman, Farrens, Luck, & Proudfit, 2014), although they 
may not sustain engagement with those images (Kappenman, 
MacNamara, & Proudfit, 2015). These findings suggest that 
although threatening images capture attention, non-anxious 
individuals may be able to effectively and quickly disengage 
from such stimuli.
One proposed explanation for the discrepancy between 
behavioural and neural measures of attentional bias is that 
behavioural measures simply lack sufficient internal reli-
ability to uncover these biases (Kappenman, MacNamara, 
& Proudift, 2015). Over the past decade, the psychometric 
properties of response time (RT) measures of attentional 
biases have been explicitly investigated, and several studies, 
using a wide range of stimuli, have shown that biases in the 
dot-probe task have poor internal reliability (Amir, Zvielli, 
& Bernstein, 2016; Cooper et al., 2011; Dear, Sharpe, Nich-
olas, & Refshauge, 2011; Kappenman et al., 2014, 2015; 
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Reutter, Hewig, Wieser, & Osinsky, 2017; Schäfer et al., 
2016; Schmukle 2005; Staugaard 2009; Van Bockstaele 
et al., 2011; Waechter, Nelson, Wright, Hyatt, & Oakman, 
2014; Waechter & Stolz, 2015; Zvielli, Bernstein, & Koster, 
2015; see Rodebaugh et al., 2016, for a discussion of reli-
ability in the dot-probe task). In other words, participants do 
not show a consistent bias towards (or away from) emotional 
stimuli on a trial-by-trial basis. Although some fluctuation is 
to be expected, these studies have shown that the reliability 
of attentional biases often approaches zero (see Table 1 for a 
summary of findings from published studies of internal reli-
ability). Such poor reliability calls into question the validity 
of attentional bias measured by the dot-probe task: if these 
biases are so inconsistent, then how can this task provide any 
insight into attention to threat?
While some researchers suggest that poor reliability 
indicates that the dot-probe task is inherently flawed and 
unsuited for assessing attentional bias (e.g., Kappenman 
et al., 2014), it might in fact reflect the variability in the 
time course of different attentional processes. Many models 
conceptualise attention as a series of component processes 
including selection, orienting, engagement, disengagement, 
and shifting (Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 
2004; Koster, Verschuere, Crombez, & Van Damme, 2005; 
Posner, Cohen, & Rafal, 1982); some of these processes 
may be deployed with consistent timing from trial to trial, 
while others may be more variable. In line with this idea, 
recent electrophysiological studies in non-anxious popula-
tions have revealed dissociations in the reliability of two 
ERP components that are used to measure attention to emo-
tional stimuli (Kappenman et al., 2014, 2015): the earlier 
N2pc, indexing initial attentional selection, and the later 
LPP, indexing sustained engagement with a stimulus. The 
N2pc reveals an attentional bias towards threatening images 
in the dot-probe task that has moderate reliability (much 
greater than behavioural measures, r’s = .5–.9; Kappenman 
et al., 2014, 2015; Reutter et al., 2017). On the other hand, 
the LPP shows no evidence of sustained engagement with 
the threat stimulus, and has poor internal reliability (Kap-
penman et al., 2015). These findings suggest that individuals 
are consistent in their initial attentional selection, while the 
duration of engagement with the emotional stimulus before 
disengagement takes place is much less consistent. Because 
behavioural measures of attentional bias are likely an index 
of multiple attentional processes (Koster et al., 2004, 2005), 
the stability of these underlying processes is crucial to the 
reliability of the behavioural measures.
The poor internal reliability of attentional biases in the 
dot-probe task could, therefore, be explained by dissocia-
tions in the consistency with which selection, engagement, 
and disengagement mechanisms are deployed. Importantly, 
most studies investigating reliability of the dot-probe task 
present cue stimuli 500 ms prior to the appearance of the 
probe (stimulus onset asynchrony, SOA; see Table 1). Given 
the speed of covert attentional shifts (< 100 ms, Buschman 
& Miller, 2009; Müller & Rabbitt, 1989), attention could 
be redirected or redistributed a number of times across the 
500 ms SOA interval. There could also be variability in the 
timecourse of disengagement processes, as suggested by the 
poor reliability of the LPP (Kappenman et al., 2015), mak-
ing the locus of attention at the time of probe onset highly 
variable across trials. In light of these multiple degrees of 
freedom, it is perhaps unsurprising that attentional biases 
have poor reliability; by measuring bias with an SOA of 
500 ms, reaction time measures are likely tapping into dif-
ferent stages of attentional processing on each trial. This 
time course hypothesis leads to the prediction that reliability 
should be much higher if the task is able to directly tap the 
initial selection or orienting stage of attention, before more 
variable processes occur. This could be accomplished by 
reducing the SOA (e.g., to 100 ms), so that attention is still 
biased to the preferred stimulus when the probe appears.
While the predominant presentation time in the dot-probe 
task is 500 ms, manipulations of SOA are commonly used to 
isolate different attentional processes (Bradley, Mogg, Falla, 
& Hamilton, 1998; Koster et al., 2005; Mogg, Bradley, De 
Bono, & Painter, 1997). However, few studies have included 
multiple SOAs when assessing reliability of attentional 
biases, and those that include multiple SOAs do not directly 
compare reliabilities across them (see e.g., Schmukle, 2005; 
Staugaard, 2009). In three experiments, we investigated the 
internal reliability of attentional biases across a range of 
SOAs (100, 300, 500, and 900 ms), to determine whether 
reliability is related to the time course of attentional process-
ing. At very short SOAs, bias measures should primarily 
reflect the initial (perhaps automatic) selection and orient-
ing of attention to the threat-related stimulus. Given the 
electrophysiological evidence reviewed above, we might 
expect these bias measures to be reliable. At mid-range 
SOAs, attentional deployment might be expected to vary 
more widely from trial to trial, resulting in lower reliabil-
ity. We included the much longer (900 ms) SOA in Experi-
ment 1 to test a further hypothesis. Attentional biases at 
very long SOAs are thought to reflect an eventual “resting” 
place of attention, and may show either bias towards threat 
(vigilance), or alternatively away from threat (avoidance; 
Booth, 2014; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, 
& Wiersema, 2006; Onnis, Dadds, & Bryant, 2011). If this 
propensity for vigilance versus avoidance is a stable indi-
vidual difference, reliability at the 900 ms SOA should again 
improve.
In all three experiments, we recruited participants from 
a general student population and not from a clinically anx-
ious population. However, in Experiment 2, we also assessed 
state anxiety, to determine whether it modulates the reli-
ability of attentional biases. In Experiments 1 and 2, we 
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Table 1  Estimates of internal reliability in existing published studies
Table includes studies that assessed reliability in a dot-probe task to measure threat-related biases in a non-selected (or non-clinical) population. 
Condition refers to participant subgroups or experimental manipulations. Task refers to the probe task. Method of calculation: SH even–odd or 
random split-half method, F/S first-half/second-half split method, Comp. computational methods. For reliability, aindicates values with Spear-
man–Brown correction. For bias measures, vigilance indicates bias towards threat, ns indicates no significant bias. bIn Waechter & Stolz (2015), 
a high anxious subgroup showed an attentional bias away from angry faces (i.e., avoidance)
Authors Condition Stimuli n SOA (ms) # trials Task Method Reliability Bias
Amir et al. (2016) – Threat scenes 59 500 80 Location F/S .19a Vigilance
Cooper et al. 
(2011)
500 16 Discrimination SH
Expt. 1 Control Fearful faces 20 (ws) .08 ns
CO2 challenge − .08 Vigilance
Expt. 2 Control Fearful faces 30 (ws) − .22 Vigilance
CO2 challenge .26 ns
Control Angry faces − .01 Vigilance
CO2 challenge .09 ns
Dear et al. (2011) 500 40 Discrimination SH
Control Pain-related 
pictures
100 .05 Not reported
Pain-related words − .05 Not reported
Chronic pain Pain-related 
pictures
139 .25 Not reported
Pain-related words .10 Not reported
Kappenman et al. 
(2014)
– Threat scenes 96 500 360 Discrimination SH .030a ns
Kappenman et al. 
(2015)
– Threat scenes 30 500 400 Discrimination SH .35a ns
Reutter et al. 
(2017)
– Angry faces 92 500 288 Discrimination SH .056 ns
Schäfer et al. 
(2016)
– Angry faces 144 500 48 Discrimination F/S .12a Not reported
Schmukle (2005) – Detection SH
Exp 1 Social/physical 
threat words
80 100 64 .03 Not reported
450–675 64 − .15 Not reported
Exp 2 – Threat scenes 40 500 48 − .08 Not reported




500 − .054 Vigilance
Modified dot-
probe




– Spiders 55 500 64 Discrimination SH .15 ns
Waechter et al. 
(2014)
Angry faces 500 64 Discrimination Comp
Low anxious 40 − .10 ns
High anxious 41 − .10 ns
Waechter and Stolz 
(2015)
Angry faces 500 64 Location Comp
Control 76 .59a ns
Anxious 82 .15a nsb
Zvielli et al. (2015) 
Exp 2
– Smoking-related 45 500 80 Location F/S .06a
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followed the common practice in the literature of presenting 
the faces throughout the SOA period. However, this prac-
tice confounds SOA with stimulus duration. Therefore, in 
Experiment 3, we eliminated this confound by presenting all 
faces for a short fixed stimulus duration regardless of SOA, 
to determine whether extended exposure to the faces might 
account for poor reliability at mid-range SOAs.
Experiment 1
In the first experiment, to cover a broad range of SOAs, we 
presented threatening and neutral faces to the left and right 
of fixation for 100, 300, 500, or 900 ms prior to the onset of 
the probe stimulus. The experiment was conducted in two 
parts, such that participants completed trials with just three 
SOAs: 100, 300, and 500 ms in Experiment 1A and 100, 
500, and 900 ms in Experiment 1B.
Method
Participants
One-hundred and thirty-three first-year psychology students 
participated in Experiment 1; 68 in Experiment 1A, and 65 
in Experiment 1B. Six participants in Experiment 1A were 
excluded from analysis for poor accuracy (> 3 SDs below 
mean accuracy on any block), one for slow response times 
(> 3 SDs above mean on any block) and one for not main-
taining position in the chin rest during the task. Three par-
ticipants in Experiment 1B were excluded for poor accuracy. 
The two experiments, therefore, comprised a total of 122 
participants, aged between 18 and 25 years (15 men and 45 
women, Mage = 18.68 years, SD = 1.24, in Experiment 1A; 
15 men and 47 women, Mage = 18.42 years, SD = 1.05, in 
Experiment 1B), with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
These sample sizes were sufficient to detect reliabilities of 
r > .30 in each experiment, and greater than r > .22 when 
participants from both experiments were combined for the 
100 and 500 ms SOAs, given 80% power.1 Participants com-
pleted the task in groups of up to four, seated in separate 
cubicles. All participants gave informed consent, and the 
study was approved by the School of Psychology Human 
Ethics Committee, Victoria University of Wellington.
Materials and apparatus
The experiment was presented on a Dell Precision T1700 
computer running OpenSesame (Mathôt, Schreij, & Theeu-
wes, 2012) using a 24″ inch AOC monitor with a resolution 
of 1920 by 1080 pixels and a 120 Hz vertical refresh rate. 
Participants were seated at a viewing distance of 57.3 cm 
from the monitor, maintained by use of a chin rest.
Angry and neutral face pairs of six male actors were taken 
from the NimStim facial expressions set (#20, 21, 23, 24, 
25, 34; Tottenham et al., 2009). Angry faces showed open 
mouths, while neutral faces had closed mouths. All faces 
were greyscaled and edited to include only the face and hair, 
then superimposed on a grey rectangle, such that the point 
between the eyes was at the rectangle’s centre. The pairs of 
faces from each model were equated for average pixel lumi-
nance and root mean square contrast with the SHINE Image 
Processing Toolbox for MATLAB (Willenbockel et al., 
2010). Resulting images had a mean luminance of 40 cd/
m2, and were presented against a dark grey background with 
mean luminance of 16 cd/m2.
Procedure
Each trial began with a 25% grey fixation cross (0.6° × 0.6°) 
presented in the centre of the screen for a random interval 
between 400 and 800 ms. The fixation cross remained on 
screen until probe offset, and participants were instructed to 
fixate on the cross while it remained on screen. Two faces, 
one angry and one neutral (from the same model), subtend-
ing 6.9° × 9.0° of visual angle each, were presented with the 
inner edge of the face rectangle appearing 2.4° to the left 
or right of fixation. Immediately following the offset of the 
faces, a probe was presented for 100 ms consisting of two 
25% grey dots in either a vertical or horizontal orientation 
(: or. .) in the location previously occupied by the centre of 
the angry face (angry cue) or neutral face (neutral cue), 5.9° 
to the left or right of fixation. Participants were required to 
report the orientation of the dot pair with their dominant 
hand using the ‘1’ or ‘2’ keys on the number pad, with key 
mapping counterbalanced across participants. Trials ended 
after a response was made, or 1700 ms following the offset 
of the dots. Incorrect or omitted responses resulted in a short 
tone presented through headphones as feedback.
Participants completed three blocks of 96 trials, one for 
each SOA (100, 300, or 500 ms in Experiment 1A; 100, 
500, or 900 ms in Experiment 1B). Block order was coun-
terbalanced across participants. Blocks consisted of two sub-
blocks of 48 trials, separated by a break, each consisting 
of each possible combination of angry face location (left, 
right), probe location (left, right), probe orientation (vertical, 
horizontal), and image model (one of six). Thus, the probe 
was presented an equal number of times in the location of 
1 Power was calculated assuming a one-tailed test, as negative reli-
abilities are meaningless. This method underestimates the true power 
of our Experiments, as it is based on a single correlation coefficient 




the angry and neutral face, such that faces were not pre-
dictive of probe location. Prior to the experimental blocks, 
participants completed a block of 48 practice trials with an 
SOA of 500 ms, using angry and neutral faces of a model 
not included in the experimental blocks (NimStim #37; Tot-
tenham et al., 2009).
Statistical analysis
Attentional bias Only response times for correct responses 
were used in analyses. Individual response times for each 
participant on each trial were inverse transformed (1/RT) to 
minimize the effects of slow RTs on means (Ratcliff, 1993). 
Mean response times for each cue type were calculated 
from the transformed data, and these were then reverted 
to ms, as bias scores are best interpreted in ms units. Bias 
scores were calculated by subtracting mean response times 
for angry cues from mean response times for neutral cues 
 (RTneutral − RTangry).
Reliability Attentional bias is a difference score, and so a 
standard Cronbach’s alpha can only be calculated by arti-
ficially arranging individual trials into different subsets 
based on specific faces or locations (e.g., Schmukle, 2005; 
Staugaard, 2009; Dear et al., 2011). Alternatively, a split-
half reliability can be calculated (see Table 1), in which 
two bias scores are calculated for each participant (for 
example, based on odd or even trials, or the first and sec-
ond halves of an experiment; see Williams & Kaufmann, 
2012, for a discussion of different methods), and then, 
these are correlated. However, this method provides only 
two samples of the bias for each participant, and an esti-
mated reliability that lies somewhere along a distribution 
of possible reliabilities. A better estimate can be calcu-
lated using computational methods (MacLeod et al., 2010; 
Williams & Kaufmann, 2012; Waechter et  al., 2014), in 
which each participant’s response time data are randomly 
split in half many times. Our analysis was carried out on 
1000 random splits of the data using R (Version 3.1.1; R 
Core Team, 2015). Angry and neutral cue trials were split 
in half independently, and bias scores were calculated as 
described above. The pair of bias measures obtained in 
each iteration were then correlated, providing a distri-
bution of reliabilities from which a mean and standard 
deviation were calculated. An important advantage of 
this method is that it reduces sampling variability that 
can occur when just one random split of the data is done, 
and, therefore, minimizes the impact of other sources of 
RT variability. Where noted, reliabilities are corrected for 
test length using the Spearman–Brown prophecy formula 
(Spearman, 1910). This value (indicated as rSB) corrects 
for the fact that any test is divided in half to calculate a 
split-half reliability, which reduces any correlation rela-
tive to a test–retest reliability (in which the entire test is 
repeated; DeVellis, 1991; Miller & Ulrich, 2013). The for-
mula uses the relationship between test length and reliabil-
ity to provide a predicted reliability for the test, were it to 
be presented at its full length. We use uncorrected r values 
for our statistical analyses, but also present corrected val-
ues to facilitate comparison with the other measures in the 
literature. For psychometric purposes, corrected reliabil-
ity is conventionally considered “respectable” for r’s > .70 
and “unacceptable” for r’s < .60 (DeVellis, 1991).
Similarly, we estimated the reliability of RTs for each cue 
valence: data from angry and neutral cue trials were split in 
half independently, mean RT in each half was calculated for 
each participant, and the halves were correlated. Reliability 
was calculated as the mean correlation across 1000 random 
splits of the data.
Significance of each reliability estimate was calculated 
using permutation tests. The data set was subjected to the 
same procedure as described above, except that trials were 
randomly labelled as having “angry” or “neutral” cues. For 
each SOA, labels were randomly permuted prior to reliabil-
ity analysis. One-thousand mean reliability estimates (each 
consisting of 1000 splits) from random permutations of the 
data formed the null distribution, and the p value was calcu-
lated as the proportion of the null distribution with reliability 
greater than the mean of the original, non-permuted data. 
This is equivalent to a one-tailed significance test.
Because we were also interested in whether reliability 
was greater at some SOAs than others, we statistically com-
pared reliability estimates for each pair of SOAs. For each 
SOA, 10,000 samples (with replacement) were drawn from 
the computational reliability distribution. For each pairwise 
comparison, the p value was calculated as the proportion of 
samples for one SOA in which reliability was greater than 
for the other SOA.
Results and Discussion
Experiments 1A and 1B were analysed separately. Accuracy 
and response time data were subjected to 3 (SOA: 100, 300, 
and 500 ms in Experiment 1A; 100, 500, and 900 ms in 
Experiment 1B) × 2 (cue valence: angry, neutral) repeated-
measures Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs).
Accuracy
Overall, participants were highly accurate in identifying the 
orientation of dots (M = 93.0%, SD = 3.5% in Experiment 
1A; M = 92.3%, SD = 5.1% in Experiment 1B). Analysis 
of each experiment revealed no main effects or interaction, 




Mean response times and bias scores for each SOA in all 
experiments are presented in Table 2. To assess whether 
participants showed group-level behavioural biases at any 
SOA, ANOVAs were conducted on mean correct response 
times in each experiment. In Experiment 1A, this revealed 
no main effects of SOA, F(2, 118) = 0.28, p = .756, 2
p
 = 
.005, nor cue valence, F(1, 59) = 0.92, p = .342, 2
p
 = .015, 
but an SOA × cue valence interaction, F(2, 118) = 4.64, p 
= .011, 2
p
 = .073. To further explore this interaction, bias 
scores were calculated and one-sample t-tests revealed that 
biases at 100 ms significantly differed from zero, t(59) = 
2.81, p = .007, d = 0.14. Unexpectedly, participants showed 
a significant bias away from the angry face at 100 ms. Bias 
scores at 300 and 500 ms did not significantly differ from 
zero, both t’s < 1.
In Experiment 1B, analyses revealed a main effect of 
SOA, F(2, 122) = 4.11, p = .019, 2
p
 = .063. Post-hoc Bon-
ferroni corrected comparisons revealed a general speed-
ing in response for trials with shorter SOAs, such that 
response times were overall faster during 100 ms SOA 
blocks (M = 478 ms, SD = 80) than 900 ms blocks (M = 
493 ms, SD = 89; p = .047); however, neither were sig-
nificantly different from response times on 500 ms blocks 
(M = 481 ms, SD = 86; p’s > .10). Neither the main effect 
of cue valence, F(1, 61) = 0.02, p = .900, 2
p
 < .001, nor 
the SOA × cue valence interaction were significant, F(2, 
122) = 0.48, p = .623, 2
p
 = .008, showing that there were 
no significant attentional biases in this experiment. Thus, 
the bias away from angry faces in the 100 ms condition 
of Experiment 1A was not replicated in Experiment 1B.
Reliability
Reliability of RTs in all conditions in both experiments was 
high (r’s > .86, Supplementary Table S1). Means and SDs 
of bias score reliability distributions for all experiments 
are presented in Table 3. In Experiment 1A, reliability was 
marginally significant at 100 ms, r = .140, p = .084; when 
adjusted for test length, this measure of reliability was low 
(r = .140; rSB = .246). Reliability at 300 and 500 ms did not 
significantly differ from zero, both p’s > .58. Comparing reli-
abilities to each other shows that reliability at 100 ms was 
marginally greater than at 300 ms, p = .078, but not 500 ms, 
p = .112, which did not differ, p = .424. In Experiment 
1B, reliability was again marginally significant at 100 ms, 
p = .051. When adjusted for test length, this measure of reli-
ability was still low by conventional standards (r = .186; 
rSB = .313). Reliability at 500 and 900 ms did not signifi-
cantly differ from zero, both p’s > .55. At 100 ms, reliability 
was marginally greater than at both 500 ms, p = .088, and 
900 ms, p = .073, which did not differ, p = .462.
Because the 100 and 500 ms SOA blocks were effectively 
equivalent across experiments 1A and 1B, we combined the 
two data sets and analysed reliability in the larger sample. 
Reliability was significantly greater than zero for biases at 
100 ms, p = .020, although still low after correcting for test 
length (r = .162; rSB = .279). Reliability was poor (r = − .092) 
and not significant at 500 ms, p = .672. Reliability at 100 ms 
Table 2  Mean response 
time (ms) and bias scores as 
a function of SOA in each 
experiment
Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Bias scores are calculated as RT(neutral cue) − RT(angry cue)
*p < .05
Condition Experiment 1A Experiment 1B Experiment 2 Experiment 3
100 ms SOA
 Neutral 465 (65) 477 (80) 478 (68) 453 (80)
 Angry 474 (63) 480 (82) 477 (63) 456 (82)




 Bias Score 2 (21)
500 ms SOA
 Neutral 474 (73) 482 (88) 484 (74) 426 (82)
 Angry 472 (68) 481 (86) 487 (71) 425 (19)




 Bias Score 1 (24)
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was significantly greater than at 500 ms, p = .029. This lat-
ter finding is consistent with our prediction that reliability 
would be improved when bias scores primarily reflect atten-
tional selection and/or orienting.
To summarise, reliability of attentional biases was greater 
than zero at 100 ms but not at any other SOAs tested. How-
ever, this estimate of reliability is still considerably lower 
than is acceptable by conventional psychometric standards. 
By 300 ms, reliability was not significantly greater than zero, 
suggesting that the allocation of attention becomes inconsist-
ent shortly following the initial attentional processes. As in 
previous studies (e.g., Schmukle, 2005; Staugaard, 2009), 
biases at 500 ms were unreliable. We further show that bias 
is unreliable at 900 ms, suggesting that even at long SOAs, 
attentional bias scores do not reliably reflect individual dif-
ferences in attentional allocation either towards or away from 
threat.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we attempted to improve the reliability 
of attentional bias measurements. Reliability is directly 
linked to the number of trials used for analysis (Miller & 
Ulrich, 2013; Williams & Kaufmann, 2012). Therefore, 
we assessed reliability of attentional biases after doubling 
the number of trials used at the two critical SOAs (100 
and 500 ms). Furthermore, we also collected measures 
of anxiety and of self-reported attentional control. Previ-
ous studies have not consistently found a link between 
individual differences in anxiety and biases in the dot-
probe task (Bradley et al., 1997; Kappenman et al., 2015), 
though such a link is predicted by theories of emotion and 
attention (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Bishop, 2008; Eysenck, 
Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007; Eysenck & Derakshan, 
2011; Okon-Singer et al., 2013). One proposed explanation 
for this discrepancy is the poor reliability of measures of 
attentional biases, because correlations based on unreli-
able measures are themselves unreliable. In this experi-
ment, we expected that increasing the trial numbers would 
further improve the reliability of the measure of attentional 
biases at 100 ms, but perhaps not 500 ms, given that the 




Eighty-nine participants completed the experiment in 
exchange for course credit. Three participants were 
excluded for low accuracy (> 3 SDs below mean accu-
racy at either SOA). The final sample consisted of 86 par-
ticipants (19 men and 67 women), aged between 18 and 
30 years (M = 19.00 years, SD = 2.15, one participant did 
not provide their age). This sample size is sufficient to 
detect reliability of r > .26 with 80% power.
Procedure
The stimuli and procedure were the same as in Experiment 
1 with the following exceptions. Participants completed 
eight blocks of 48 trials that alternated between 100 and 
500 ms probe SOAs (192 total trials at each SOA). The 
starting block was counterbalanced across participants. 
Prior to the experimental blocks, participants completed 
a block of 48 practice trials with face cues presented for 
300 ms. Following the experiment, participants completed 
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger & Syde-
man, 1994), which consists of 42 items assessing symp-
toms of anxiety, and the Attentional Control Scale (Derry-
berry & Reed, 2002), which consists of 20 items assessing 
an individual’s self-reported ability to control and focus 
their attention on real-world tasks. Internal reliability of 
each scale was acceptable in this sample (α’s > .85). Par-
ticipants also completed the Fear of Spiders Questionnaire 
(Szymanski and O’Donohue, 1995) as part of recruitment 
for other studies in our lab; findings are not reported here.
Table 3  Mean (SD) reliability of bias scores as a function of SOA in each experiment
*p < .05
† p < .10





100 ms SOA .140† (.108) .186† (.113) .162* (.082) − .119 (.091) .176* (.095) .091 (.100) .181* (.097)
300 ms SOA − .074 (.106)
500 ms SOA − .046 (.110) − .025 (.106) − .044 (.065) − .021 (.091) − .038 (.092) − .125 (.086) − .141 (.100)




Accuracy and response time data were analysed in sepa-
rate 2 (SOA: 100, 500 ms) × 2 (cue valence: angry, neutral) 
repeated-measures ANOVAs.
Accuracy
Overall, accuracy was high (M = 93.5%, SD = 4.2), and 
analyses revealed no main effects or interaction, F’s < 1.
Response times
Mean response times and bias scores at each SOA are pre-
sented in Table 2. To assess whether participants showed 
group-level behavioural biases at either SOA, we ana-
lysed mean correct response times. There was a main 
effect of SOA, F(1, 85) = 5.04, p = .027, 2
p
 = .056, which 
reflected faster responses in the 100 ms block (M = 478 ms, 
SD  =  64.7) than in the 500  ms block (M  =  485  ms, 
SD = 72.3). However, there was no significant main effect 
of cue valence, F(1, 85) = 1.53, p = .220, 2
p
 = .018, nor a 
significant interaction between SOA and cue valence, F(1, 
85) = 2.41, p = .124, 2
p
 = .028, showing that there were no 
significant attentional biases in this experiment.
Reliability
Reliability of mean RT was high in each of the individual 
conditions (r’s > .91, Supplementary Table S1). Means and 
SDs of reliability estimates for bias scores are presented 
in Table 3. In contrast to Experiment 1, reliability was not 
greater than zero at either 100 ms, p = .200, or 500 ms, 
p = .900, although reliability was marginally greater at 
100 ms than at 500 ms, p = .050. Because of the increased 
number of trials, participants may have adjusted the way 
that they control their attention to the stimuli during the 
experiment, leading to changes in reliability over time. To 
test for this possibility, we split trials from each SOA into 
halves corresponding to the first and second parts of each 
SOA block. For the first 92 trials, reliability was not greater 
than zero at 100 ms, p = .932, or 500 ms, p = .558, and these 
estimates did not differ from each other, p = .213. For the 
last 92 trials, however, reliability was significantly above 
zero at 100 ms, p = .020 (providing similar reliability to that 
in Experiment 1 when corrected for test length; r = .176; rSB 
= .299), but not at 500 ms, p = .636. Statistically, reliability 
was marginally greater at 100 than 500 ms, p = .051.
Contrary to our expectations, using twice as many trials 
per SOA as in Experiment 1 did not improve the internal 
reliability of attentional bias (see Miller & Ulrich, 2013; 
Williams & Kaufmann, 2012). However, when trials were 
separated into the first and second half of the experiment 
(such that trial numbers were equivalent to those in Experi-
ment 1), we found that reliability was greater than zero for 
the 100 ms SOA, but only in the second half of the experi-
ment. This finding should be considered exploratory, given 
that we had no hypotheses to suggest that reliability should 
improve over trials.
Relationship to anxiety
There was a moderate, negative relationship between trait 
anxiety as assessed with the STAI-T and self-reported 
attentional control as assessed with the Attentional Control 
Scale, r(85) = − .477, p < .001, such that greater reported 
anxiety was related to poorer self-reported attentional 
control. Attentional bias at 100 ms was unrelated to both 
anxiety, r(85) = .100, p = .357, and attentional control, 
r(85) = .026, p = .814. For attentional bias at 500 ms, there 
was a marginal, weak, positive relationship with anxiety, 
r(85) = .184, p = .091, but no relationship with attentional 
control, r(85) = − .131, p = .230. Attentional biases at 100 
and 500 ms were unrelated, r(85) = .170, p = .117.
Because anxiety and attentional control are thought to be 
related to attentional biases (Eysenck et al., 2007; Eysenck & 
Derakshan, 2011), we expected that improved reliability at 
shorter SOAs might allow us to observe such relationships. 
Many studies have failed to find a relationship between these 
measures and attentional bias (e.g., Bradley et al., 1997; 
Kappenman et al., 2015), but this may have been due to the 
poor reliability of bias scores. Because internal reliability 
was not high in this experiment, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that no significant relationships were observed.
Experiment 3
In Experiment 3, we made two changes to overcome some 
limitations in the previous experiments. First, in both 
Experiments 1 and 2, only six individual faces were pre-
sented (with an angry and a neutral expression for each), and 
therefore, each face was presented many times (48 times in 
Experiment 1 and 64 times in Experiment 2). Overexposure 
to the faces may have reduced their novelty, and therefore, 
the amount of attention they received, reducing our ability 
to observe an attentional bias. We therefore increased our 
stimulus set to 16 individuals (with an angry and neutral 
expression for each), which were only presented 16 times 
each across the course of Experiment 3.
Second, although most dot-probe studies manipulate the 
presentation duration of cues alongside SOA (i.e., the cues 
are present across the whole interval), this procedure con-
founds stimulus duration and SOA. Because many additional 
processes will be engaged while faces are present (e.g., 
memory processes, eye movements, or face perception), 
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unreliable biases at longer SOA may reflect variable deploy-
ment of these processes, and not attentional allocation per 
se. Therefore, in Experiment 3, we held the stimulus dura-
tion constant at 70 ms while changing the cue-to-target inter-
val to manipulate SOA.
Method
Participants
Seventy-nine participants completed the experiment in 
exchange for course credit. Three participants were excluded 
for low accuracy (> 3 SDs below mean accuracy in either 
block). The final sample consisted of 76 participants (15 men 
and 61 women), aged between 18 and 24 years (M = 18.68 
years, SD = 1.18). This sample size is sufficient to detect 
reliability of r > .27 with 80% power.
Materials and Procedure
Angry and neutral face pairs of 16 male actors were taken 
from the NimStim facial expressions set (#20, 21, 22, 23, 
24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, and 37; Tottenham 
et al., 2009). One further actor (#33) was used for practice 
trials only. The images were edited as in Experiment 1 and 
2, and pairs were equated for average pixel luminance and 
root mean square contrast.
The procedure was similar to Experiments 1 with the fol-
lowing exceptions. Participants completed two blocks of 128 
trials, one with 100 ms SOA and one with 500 ms SOA. 
The order of blocks was counterbalanced across participants. 
Stimulus duration was fixed at 70 ms, and the cue-to-target 
interval was either 30 or 430 ms. Prior to the experimental 
blocks, participants completed a block of 48 practice trials 
with face cues presented for 300 ms.
Results and Discussion
Accuracy and response time data were analysed in sepa-
rate 2 (SOA: 100, 500 ms) × 2 (cue valence: angry, neutral) 
repeated-measures ANOVAs.
Accuracy
Overall, accuracy was high (M = 93.1%, SD = 4.3), and 
analyses revealed no main effects or nor interaction, 
F’s < 1.25, p’s > .25.
Response times
Mean response times and bias scores at each SOA are 
presented in Table  2. To assess whether participants 
showed group-level behavioural biases at either SOA, we 
analysed mean correct response times. There was a main 
effect of SOA, F(1, 75) = 27.28, p < .001, 2
p
 = .267, which 
reflected faster responses in the 500 ms block (M = 426 ms, 
SD  =  80.0) than in the 100  ms block (M  =  454  ms, 
SD = 80.2). This is opposite to the SOA effects observed 
in Experiments 1 and 2, but is to be expected in this experi-
ment, because attention is not engaged with the face across 
the face-probe interval, meaning that participants are bet-
ter able to prepare for the probe in the long SOA condi-
tion. Importantly, there was no significant main effect of 
cue valence, F(1, 75) = 0.49, p = .485, 2
p
 = .007, nor a 
significant interaction between SOA and cue valence, F(1, 
75) = 1.85, p = .178, 2
p
 = .024, showing that there were no 
significant attentional biases in this experiment.
Reliability
Reliability was high for RTs in the individual conditions 
(r’s > .91, Supplementary Table S1). Means and SDs of reli-
ability estimates for bias scores are presented in Table 3. 
Consistent with our predictions, reliability was significantly 
above zero at 100 ms, p = .036, but was still lower than con-
ventional standards (r = .181; rSB = .306). Reliability was not 
significant at 500 ms, p = .899. Furthermore, reliability was 
statistically greater at 100 than 500 ms, p = .010.
Although we created a larger stimulus set, and manip-
ulated SOA independently of stimulus presentation time, 
this experiment shows similar results to Experiment 1. Reli-
ability at 100 ms was significantly greater than zero, and 
its magnitude here (r = .181) was similar to that observed 
in Experiment 1 (r = .162). As in both the previous experi-
ments, attentional bias was not reliable at the 500 ms SOA, 
suggesting that confounds associated with extended stimulus 
duration cannot account for the poor reliability at this longer 
SOA.
General discussion
This series of experiments was motivated by a simple ques-
tion: why is the reliability of the dot-probe task so poor, 
even though neural measures suggest that even non-anxious 
people preferentially attend to threat-relevant stimuli? We 
hypothesised that an important factor might be the relatively 
long SOA (500 ms) at which reliability is most commonly 
assessed. It may well be the case that the initial selection 
and orienting of attention to a threat stimulus is reliable, but 
the long SOA means that there is ample time for attention 
to be disengaged and reallocated or redistributed before the 
probe appears. If the timecourse of these various processes 
varies from trial to trial, internal reliability of the bias should 
be expected to be low. This hypothesis leads us to predict 
that the bias should be reliable (or at least more reliable) at 
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a short (100 ms) SOA when the task more closely captures 
just the initial attention selection and orienting to the threat 
stimulus. We further hypothesised that attentional bias meas-
ures might become reliable again at very long SOA (900 ms) 
when attention can be more strategically directed towards a 
preferred stimulus (whether that bias results in vigilance or 
avoidance of the threat stimulus).
We, therefore, conducted three experiments to investigate 
the internal reliability of attentional biases in the dot-probe 
task across a range of SOAs. Consistent with our predic-
tions, biases in Experiment 1 were significantly reliable at 
100 ms, but not at other SOAs (300, 500, and 900 ms). In 
Experiment 2, in which we doubled the number of trials in 
an attempt to improve the reliability of biases, we failed to 
replicate the findings of Experiment 1 (when considering 
either the total set of trials or the first half). However, biases 
at 100 ms in the second half of this experiment showed a 
level of reliability consistent with that in Experiment 1. In 
Experiment 3, we replicated the findings of Experiment 1, 
revealing significant reliability at 100 ms but not at 500 ms. 
Because stimulus duration was fixed at 70 ms in Experiment 
3, this replication shows that poor reliability at 500 ms SOA 
is not the result of non-attentional processes (such as mem-
ory, eye movements, or other aspects of face processing) 
associated with extended stimulus duration. Collectively, 
these experiments provide evidence that the initial selec-
tion/orienting of attention shows some level of trial-to-trial 
consistency (though much lower than is generally consid-
ered to be psychometrically acceptable; DeVellis, 1991) and 
that SOA is a notable moderator of the internal reliability of 
attentional bias measures.
In addition to the poor reliability of biases at 500 ms 
across all experiments, in Experiment 1, reliability was also 
found to be poor at SOAs of 300 and 900 ms. Unreliable 
biases at 300 ms might arise because disengagement of 
attention from the emotional stimulus has already begun by 
this point. If this is the case, then future experiments could 
use a higher resolution of SOAs to track the time course of 
engagement and disengagement processes, as indicated by 
changes in reliability over time. Because covert spatial atten-
tion can be rapidly redirected (Buschman and Miller, 2009; 
Müller and Rabbitt, 1989), future studies might also inves-
tigate the reliability of attentional biases for SOAs shorter 
than 100 ms.
Previous studies have shown avoidance of threatening 
stimuli at longer SOAs (i.e., slower response times when 
probes replace the angry face; Booth 2014; Koster et al., 
2006; Onnis et al., 2011). If this avoidance of threat reflects 
a stable individual difference that is consistent from trial to 
trial, we would expect the bias to also become reliable at 
the longer 900 ms SOA. Instead, biases were unreliable still 
at this very long SOA. Assessments of reliability with such 
long SOAs are rare, but Bar-Haim and colleagues (2010) 
report significant split-half reliability of attentional biases 
to threat words with an SOA of 1000 ms (r = .45). However, 
the authors suggest that their biases might reflect the atypi-
cal characteristics of their sample, who lived in dangerous 
locations near the Gaza Strip and reported very high levels 
of anxiety, PTSD, and depression. Our sample was drawn 
from a non-selected undergraduate student population, and 
therefore our findings may not generalise to a clinically anx-
ious population for whom later attentional processes might 
be more consistently deployed from trial to trial.
Although we show that attentional biases are statistically 
reliable at the short 100 ms SOA, the reliability estimates are 
still not sufficiently high to justify their use as an individual 
difference measure in studies where the goal is to correlate 
bias with other traits. In these experiments, we chose to use a 
specific set of stimulus and task parameters (face size, eccen-
tricity, probe detection task, etc.), which we held constant 
while we manipulated SOA. It is possible that other stimulus 
parameters might have led to better reliability at the 100 ms 
SOA, and the search for those parameters might lead to a 
better dot-probe task. However, the limitations on reliability 
might also be statistical and, therefore, difficult to overcome. 
Several researchers have noted the poor reliability in a num-
ber of cognitive tasks (not just the dot-probe task; e.g., Ross, 
Richler, & Gauthier, 2015; Strauss et al., 2005) that rely on 
difference scores as a dependent measure. A recent report 
by Hedge and colleagues (Hedge, Powell, & Sumner, 2017) 
shows that this problem extends even to well established 
and robust effects in cognitive psychology including Stroop, 
flanker, and spatial cueing effects. While response times on 
such tasks can be highly reliable (as they are in our dot-
probe experiments reported here), the difference between 
two response times, which is calculated to isolate a specific 
set of cognitive processes, often has very poor reliability. 
Hedge and colleagues show that this is because such dif-
ference scores, by design, lack inter-individual variability. 
This is what makes them ideal for experimental research, but 
makes them poor measures of individual differences. Thus, 
while we show here that the dot-probe task will produce a 
more reliable measure of attentional bias when it specifically 
targets early attentional selection or orienting (i.e., using a 
short SOA), there may be hard limits on how reliable any 
difference measure can be.
Across the experiments reported here, we did not observe 
an attentional bias towards angry faces. Indeed, a signifi-
cant bias was observed only in the 100 ms SOA condition 
and only in Experiment 1A and that was a bias away from 
the angry face. Given that this effect did not replicate in 
the other experiments, it is most likely a spurious finding. 
Examination of the literature similarly suggests that biases 
at 100 ms are inconsistent, with some studies reporting a 
bias towards threat (Holmes, Green, & Vuilleumier, 2005; 
Cooper, & Langton, 2006) and some studies showing a bias 
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away from threat (Koster et al., 2005; Mogg et al., 1997). 
Our findings are, therefore, consistent with the literature 
(e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2007) showing that attentional biases 
to threat are not consistently observed in non-anxious par-
ticipants on the dot-probe task, even though neural meas-
ures do reveal the existence of biases (Eimer & Kiss, 2007; 
Grimshaw et al., 2014; Holmes, Bradley, Nielsen, & Mogg, 
2009; Kappenman et al., 2014, 2015).
One might question what it means for a bias to be reliable, 
but not significantly different from zero. It is worth noting 
that the zero point lies midway on a continuum that lies 
between attentional bias towards threat, and attentional bias 
away from threat. Thus, it is possible for individuals to have 
a stable (i.e., reliable) attentional bias either towards or away 
from threat, while no systematic directional bias is observed 
at the group level. Table 1 further shows that in other studies, 
reliability is not dependent on the existence of an attentional 
bias. However, such a pattern of biases (both towards and 
away from threat) is not consistent with neural measures 
that suggest a population-level attentional bias to threat, 
even in non-anxious individuals. Our findings provide no 
obvious explanation for this discrepancy. One possibility is 
that neural measures are tapping different processes than the 
behavioural task. For example, the N2pc (which consistently 
shows an attentional bias to threat in non-anxious partici-
pants) might actually measure attentional selection but not 
orienting (Hilimire, Hickey, & Corballis, 2013; Sawaki & 
Luck, 2010). Because non-anxious participants are thought 
to have greater control over their attention (Eysenck et al., 
2007; Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011), they might be able to 
suppress capture by the irrelevant threatening image, lead-
ing to an N2pc that reflects “attend-to-me” tagging of the 
emotional stimulus, without associated behavioural bias (see 
Sawaki & Luck, 2010, for a similar hypothesis regarding 
suppression of distraction by salient singletons). Notably, 
most of the studies that report an emotion-related N2pc in a 
dot-probe paradigm also report no such bias in RT (Grim-
shaw et al., 2014; Kappenman et al., 2014, 2015; Reutter 
et al., 2017).
Importantly, several findings now suggest that more direct 
(i.e., not response time based) correlates of attentional bias 
for dot-probe tasks might have better internal reliability. In 
addition to the good reliability of the N2pc (Kappenman 
et al., 2014, 2015; Reutter et al., 2017), attentional bias as 
reflected in lateral prefrontal activation to emotional stimuli 
has recently been shown to have moderate test–retest reli-
ability (White et al., 2016). Eye-tracking measures might 
also provide more direct measures. For example, Waechter 
et al. (2014) tracked gaze in a free-viewing paradigm, find-
ing that total dwell time on an emotional (compared to a neu-
tral) face provided a reliable measure of bias. However, these 
direct measures do not necessarily correlate with response 
time measures (Kappenman et al., 2014, 2015; Reutter et al., 
2017; Waechter et al., 2014), or with traits such as anxiety 
(Kappenman et al., 2014, 2015; but see Reutter et al., 2017); 
therefore, further investigation is needed to understand how 
these measures are related to attention to threat.
Individual differences in attentional bias have been pro-
posed to account for a range of psychological phenomena, 
and therefore the reliable measurement of such biases is an 
important goal. While the poor internal reliability of atten-
tional biases as measured by many tasks (not just the dot-
probe) is now well documented (Cisler, Bacon, & Williams, 
2009; Strauss, Allen, Jorgensen, & Cramer, 2005), there has 
been little consideration of how experimental manipula-
tions can affect reliability. Many attentional bias research-
ers ignore the issue of reliability altogether. We, therefore, 
encourage a more systematic reporting of reliability in future 
research, so that we might develop better methods of captur-
ing individual variability in these biases. We show here that 
the time course of underlying attentional processes is one 
important factor in determining the reliability of attentional 
bias measurements. Our findings suggest that early atten-
tional selection and orienting show some level of consist-
ency in the dot-probe task, but that this stability is fleeting.
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